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1) Introduction  
 
Network Neutrality debates is about whether the network owners should 
be allowed to discriminate or prioritize certain traffic on their networks 
based on its origin or its type. Historical developments, technological 
changes, economical, and social aspects require in depth analysis to 
understand the debate. The purpose of this essay is to provide a summary 
of opinions on this debate including technical, economic and social issues  
The essay begins with the analysis of the historical developments on 
both telephone and data networks in order to understand the roots of the 
centralized and decentralized network design. This portion also addresses 
end-to-end design and time sensitive data concepts that are crucial to 
understand this debate in depth.  
The following chapter analyzes the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 
looks into recent legal decisions and the FCC’s stand on general 
broadband policy which is directly related to the Network Neutrality 
debates. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the impact of Networked Information 
Economy (a term coined by Yochai Benkler) not only in economics but also 
in social, cultural, and political fields. This chapter is largely based on 
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Benkler’s book titled “Wealth of the Networks”. The benefits of Networked 
Information Economy on social welfare are critical to the Network Neutrality 
and must be included in the debate.  
The fifth chapter finally focuses on the opinions of debaters and 
analyzes at least one work from each of the cited scholars. This chapter 
also includes an analysis of competition in the last mile, innovation, 
infrastructure and vertical integration concepts with respect to Network 
Neutrality.  
In addition, the fifth chapter analyzes proposals by Yoo, Wu and 
Atkinson and Weiser. Yoo’s proposal is based on Network Diversity and 
does not encourage any kind of Network Neutrality regulation. Atkinson and 
Weiser focus on government backed general broadband policy and Wu 
proposes a Network Neutrality regulation based on Internet freedoms and 
vertical integration in the last mile.  
At the end, I list 5 points which should be the fundamental 
considerations in this debate. I believe that it is not possible to have a 
healthy debate without considering these points.  
The debate is complicated because of the dramatic impact of networks, 
mainly the Internet, on people’s lives. Therefore, concepts like innovation, 
decentralized networks, social and political aspects are analyzed 
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* For example, Jonathan Zittrain’s the Generative Internet and Yoo and Spulber’s On the 
Regulation of Networks as Complex System are not analyzed in this essay. 
throughout the chapters to emphasize their importance along with 
economic concerns.  
This essay is by no means a complete Network Neutrality Opinions 
guide. Although the essay attempts to analyze a wide variety of authors 
and papers, it is not large enough to include all of the desired details and all 
of the essays. Thus, all interested parties are highly encouraged to further 
read works about Network Neutrality debates*. 
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2) Developments in Technology 
a) Telephone Networks History 
 
Alexander Graham Bell received patent number 174,465 on March 7, 
1876 for Improvement in Telegraphy or what we currently refer as the 
telephone [1].  This device, which is used to pass voice over copper wires, 
had tremendous impact on the human history by enabling geographically 
distanced people to talk to each other instantaneously.  
Initially, all telephone calls needed to be connected to a central location 
where an operator would answer the phone. The caller would tell the 
operator where s/he would like to be connected and the operator would 
then direct his/her call to the appropriate party. However, not everybody 
was happy about the involvement of the operator for directing calls.  
Almon Brown Strowger, originally from Penfield, NY, worked as an 
undertaker in Kansas City. He was convinced that the operators were 
intentionally directing business calls to his rival. Rumor goes that one of the 
operators was the wife or cousin of his rival and all of the business calls 
would be directed to Strowger’s rival. This or some other reason led Mr. 
Strowger to invent the first electromechanical telephone switching system 
using rotary dials in 1891 [2]. The new switching system allowed the users 
to call the desired party without being connected to the operator who could 
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discriminate traffic. The invention of electromechanical switch by Strowger 
may be the first event in the modern telecommunications to enforce 
Network Neutrality.  
There have been various changes over the years in the 
telecommunications world since the invention of the electromechanical 
switches. The phone industry migrated from electromechanical to electrical 
and then to digital switches [3]. Although the technology in the telecom has 
changed dramatically, “intelligence” or the ability to deliver services and 
make decisions always stayed on the network side. The telephones, mainly 
analog, were “dumb” and provided basic features like ringing, dialing and 
passing voice with the help of the network.  
In the 1980s, the ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network) was 
deployed in various countries [4]. Even though ISDN phones were more 
“intelligent” than their analog counterparts, the main “intelligence” still 
resided in the network. The network or the switching systems would 
provide all of the services ranging from billing to connecting calls to 
interpreting digits.  
Signaling System # 7 (SS7) further increased the intelligence of the 
network by deploying Service Switching Points (SSP), Signaling Transfer 
Points (STP) or Service Control Points (SCP). These points are connected 
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through various links and the network provides various features ranging 
from caller name to the Local Number Portability to toll-free services. SS7 
is still heavily used in various parts of the telecommunications world for 
wireless and wireline carriers and it is a network centric protocol.   
Since the invention of telephone and electro-mechanical switches, the 
networks have played a major role in the telephony world. The “intelligent” 
network has provided services to the end “dumb” devices. The intelligence 
has resided on the network rather than the end devices. However, the end-
to-end design of the data networks has changed this fact. 
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b) Data Networks History 
 
In order to gain a technological lead during the cold war years, the 
United States launched the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, 
later known as the Defense ARPA or DARPA) in 1958 [5]. The purpose of 
this project was to create a robust and redundant network that can sustain 
losses and allow communication between researchers. Paul Baran, one of 
the developers of packet switching, recommended packet switching for this 
network to make it redundant and robust.  In 1969, the first node of the 
ARPANET went live as the predecessor of the Internet [5]. The network 
allowed the sharing of links due to its packet based architecture and it 
allowed various computers to communicate on the network. The network 
kept growing to include more universities and eventually started to be used 
by the general public [5].  
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ARPANET Map, 1977 [5] 
The invention of TCP/IP further increased the number of computers that 
are connected to the Internet. Since Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
provides reliable communications, the quality of the communication 
improved.  
Today, there are millions of computers connected to the Internet and the 
speed of connection is constantly increasing. While a 56 Kbps modem 
might have been considered fast in the late 1990s for end users, today 
Mbps or Gbps connections are considered normal today. Nevertheless, the 
main task of the data network did not change much. The purpose of the 
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network is to analyze the packets and move them from one location to 
another. All of the applications ranging from e-mail to instant messaging to 
voice communications are all handled by the end users. The network is fast 
but dumb and the end terminals are intelligent. Compared to the telephony 
world, the intelligence has shifted from the network to the end terminals.  
The shift of intelligence towards the end terminals is the outcome of the 
end-to-end design. The benefits of end-to-end design were proposed in 
1981 where the role of the network was considered minimal [6]. The End-
to-end principle states that the network’s job is to pass along the 
information without any kind of discrimination where one application may 
be favored over another. The end-to-end design, which empowers the end 
users rather than the network, is credited by many scholars who are 
addressed in section 5 as the main reason for the unprecedented success 
on the Internet.  
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c) Time Sensitive Data  
 
The idea of using only one network for voice and data rather than having 
two separate networks has surprisingly been in existence for almost thirty 
years. Interestingly, Network Voice Protocol (RFC 741) has been written to 
provide high quality, low bandwidth, and secure voice over the data 
network as early as 1977 [7]:  
Currently, computer communication networks are designed for data 
transfer. Since there is a growing need for communication of real-time 
interactive voice over computer networks, new communication discipline 
must be developed. The current HOST-to-HOST protocol of the ARPANET, 
which was designed (and optimized) for data transfer, was found unsuitable 
for real-time network voice communication. Therefore this Network Voice 
Protocol (NVP) was designed and implemented [7].  
NVP never became widely used and telephony networks continued 
carrying voice successfully for many years. Data networks continued to 
expand over the years and the idea of deploying real time data like voice or 
video was resurrected in the mid 1990s.  
Although TCP is a great protocol for data applications, real time 
applications like voice and video cannot solely depend on TCP/IP for 
successful deployment because the requirements for time sensitive and 
non-time sensitive data are different. Successful deployment of the time 
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sensitive data like voice, require low delay and low jitter (the change in 
delay). If these criteria are not met, real time data applications like Voice 
over IP (VoIP) are basically useless. On the other hand, non-time sensitive 
data applications like e-mail, web browsing, and file transfer can tolerate 
high delays in the networks.  
In order to provide low delay and low jitter for real time applications, 
network support is needed via priority mechanisms which would allow the 
voice packets to go ahead first in the case of congestion. Unlike end-to-end 
design that usually does not need the support of network beyond providing 
transport, real time applications need extensive help of the network to 
provide Quality of Service (QoS). 
The need to provide Quality of Service with the assistance of the 
network is at the heart of Network Neutrality debates. The real time 
communications needs the support of the network to provide QoS while 
creating a more intelligent network (the one that can prioritize or 
discriminate traffic) may jeopardize the success of the end-to-end design 
which does not depend on the network beyond transportation.  
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3) Developments in Policy 
a) Telecommunications Act of 1996  
 
Since 1934 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 has been the most 
comprehensive act in the telecommunications world. Concerning Network 
Neutrality, there are two services in the Act: Information and 
Telecommunications services. Information services can be considered as 
data applications like e-mail, web browsing and even television services, 
while telecommunications services can be considered as telephony 
services.  
In the Act, Telecommunications services are heavily regulated while 
Information services are lightly regulated. In fact, a search for the word 
“Telecommunications Services” would result in 65 hits while a search for 
the word “Information services” would result in 16 hits [8]. This fact 
demonstrates the attention given to the Telecommunications services over 
Information services. One can also speculate that the regulations that could 
inhibit the expansion of the Internet were not introduced at the time when 
the Internet was in its infancy.  
According to the Telecommunications Act, telecom carriers have the 
duty of interconnecting directly or indirectly with other telecommunications 
carriers. During the time of the Act, only the telephone companies offered 
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voice services. As of today, cable providers and even companies such as 
Vonage, which do not own any infrastructure, provide voice services. The 
phone companies wanted these restrictions to be extended to the other 
companies which offered voice services, but the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not agree.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s FCC vs. Brand X decision determined that 
cable companies are not telecommunications carriers and thus are not 
subject to the telecommunications regulations. In this case, this specifically 
meant that cable companies do not have to interconnect or open their 
network to Internet Service Providers (ISP) like Brand X [9]. The FCC 
argued that by keeping the cable companies from sharing their networks 
with others, broadband expansion would be faster and benefit the 
customers in the long run. This is a clear sign of FCC’s full commitment to 
the broadband expansion in the U.S. 
Another significant event in which the FCC intervened is the Madison 
River ISP decision. Madison ISP offered both telephony and DSL service to 
its customers. However, some of its DSL customers decided to use a rival 
voice service from Vonage. This meant that Madison ISP would lose some 
of its customers that were using its traditional analog lines. In 2004, North 
  16 
 
Carolina ISP Madison River blocked their DSL customers from using rival 
VoIP services.   
FCC, acting on a complaint from Vonage which is the provider of VoIP 
service, intervened and reached an agreement with the ISP requiring it to 
stop blocking VoIP calls and make a ‘‘voluntary payment’’ of $15,000 [10].  
b) FCC 
As can be seen in the aforementioned example, the FCC intervenes 
whenever it sees a threat to the expansion of the broadband. However, this 
expansion cannot be at the expense of the consumers’ Internet Freedom. 
Actually, the former chairman of the FCC, Michael Powell, challenged the 
broadband providers to respect Consumer’s Internet Freedom in a speech 
given in 2004 in Boulder, Colorado [11]. He listed four freedoms that 
customers have come to expect and challenged the broadband providers to 
follow these principles.  
 (1) Freedom to Access Content. 
First, consumers should have access to their choice of legal content. 
Consumers have come to expect to be able to go where they want on high-
speed connections, and those who have migrated from dial-up would 
presumably object to paying a premium for broadband if certain content 
were blocked. Thus, I challenge all facets of the industry to commit to 
allowing consumers to reach the content of their choice. I recognize that 
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network operators have a legitimate need to manage their networks and 
ensure a quality experience, thus reasonable limits sometimes must be 
placed in service contracts. Such restraints, however, should be clearly 
spelled out and should be as minimal as necessary. [11] 
 
(2) Freedom to Use Applications.  
[C]onsumers should be able to run applications of their choice. As with 
access to content, consumers have come to expect that they can generally 
run whatever applications they want. Again, such applications are critical to 
continuing the digital broadband migration because they can drive the 
demand that fuels deployment. Applications developers must remain 
confident that their products will continue to work without interference from 
other companies. No one can know for sure which “killer” applications will 
emerge to drive deployment of the next generation high-speed 
technologies. Thus, I challenge all facets of the industry to let the market 
work and allow consumers to run applications unless they exceed service 
plan limitations or harm the provider’s network. [11] 
 
(3) Freedom to Attach Personal Devices.  
[C]onsumers should be permitted to attach any devices they choose to the 
connection in their homes. Because devices give consumers more choice, 
value and personalization with respect to how they use their highspeed 
connections, they are critical to the future of broadband. Thus, I challenge 
all facets of the industry to permit consumers to attach any devices they 
choose to their broadband connection, so long as the devices operate 
within service plan limitations and do not harm the provider’s network or 
enable theft of service. [11] 
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(4) Freedom to Obtain Service Plan Information. 
[C]onsumers should receive meaningful information regarding their service 
plans. Simply put, such information is necessary to ensure that the market 
is working. Providers have every right to offer a variety of service tiers with 
varying bandwidth and feature options. Consumers need to know about 
these choices as well as whether and how their service plans protect them 
against spam, spyware and other potential invasions of privacy. [11] 
 
The four freedoms that are listed are very important for the Network 
Neutrality debate and many proponents of Network Neutrality regulation 
like Wu and Lessig used these principles in their arguments [12, 13]. 
Currently, Kevin J. Martin is the chairman of the FCC. He is not a pro-
regulation person and hopes that the cable telephone companies will not 
discriminate. He states that if the telephone and cable companies continue 
to follow the principles that are addressed above, there would not be a 
regulation required [14]. Interestingly, Kevin Martin’s statements are used 
by Christopher Yoo to oppose Network Neutrality regulations [15] and 
Powell’s words are used by Wu and Lessig to support Network Neutrality 
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4) Networked Information Economy  
a) Social Production  
 
Yochai Benkler defines two types of information economies: Industrial 
Information Economy and Networked Information Economy [16]. The 
Industrial Information Economy refers to the information economy that has 
been occurring in the last 150 years. The most distinctive character of this 
economy is the centralization of power and distribution. In order to be a 
player in this type of economy, one needs substantial capital investment. 
Benkler states:  
In the industrial economy in general, and the industrial information 
economy as well, most opportunities to make things that were valuable and 
important to many people were constrained by the physical capital 
requirements of making them. From the steam engine to the assembly line, 
from the double-rotary printing press to the communications satellite, the 
capital constraints on action were such that simply wanting to do something 
was rarely a sufficient condition to enable one to do it  [16]. 
The average person did not have the financial means to be involved in 
the industrial information economy. However, the declining cost of the 
computation, communication and storage enable the average person to be 
involved in the information economy [16].  As the financial and technical 
burdens on the end users decreased dramatically, a new kind of 
information exchange started to occur. The consumers now would become 
users where they would be able to choose what they want to follow rather 
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than being fed a generic message that would usually come from television. 
The end users can now create their own content or modify other content 
and be actively involved in the production of information.  
 In the last decade, we have seen the Internet Revolution spreading to 
the whole world. As more and more people can connect to the Internet, a 
new kind of social production is developing. This social production can be 
characterized by [16]:  
1) Non-proprietary production 
2) Non-market production 
3) Large scale collaboration 
 
Non-proprietary production, also referred to as open source software, 
allows the end users to modify any portion of the software for their own use 
as long as they publish the results with the same license. Ubuntu, an 
operating system based on Linux, is an example of such a non-proprietary 
production. 
Non-market production allows the end user to engage in activities that 
do not necessarily provide financial incentives. Such production occurred 
for hundreds of years, but now many members of the community can 
actively participate even more because of ease of access. The rise of 
websites like sourceforge.net which offers thousands of free software 
programs is clearly outside of the market production.  
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Large scale collaboration is the driving force behind the development of 
the products of the Networked Information Economy. People from all over 
the world cooperate to create various open source software programs and   
websites like Wikipedia. In the case of Wikipedia, the cooperation of the 
masses regardless of their education or background is so effective that the 
outcome of this cooperation would even compete with organized structures 
that can include subject matter experts.  
Nupedia, the predecessor of Wikipedia, was a web-based encyclopedia 
whose articles were written by experts and licensed as free content. It was 
founded by Jimmy Wales, the person who founded Wikipedia. Nupedia had 
an intense editorial process which included mainly true experts who 
possessed PhDs. However, Nupedia could not achieve success because it 
was slow and Wikipedia became far more popular as a choice of a web-
based encyclopedia [17].   
Wikipedia, like Nupedia, allows editors to contribute and it is also 
licensed as free content. The main difference between Nupedia is the fact 
that the editors are not required to have any kind of degree. Anyone can 
edit this editorial; however, only referenced works can stay permanently.  
One can ask the question of how accurate an encyclopedia can be in an 
environment where anyone can edit the content. The journal Nature 
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compared 42 science articles from Wikipedia to the gold standard of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, and concluded that “the difference in accuracy 
was not particularly great” [17]. 
There are other examples of such large scale collaboration ranging from 
Mozilla’s FireFox web browser to SETI@Home to Linux. The Networked 
Information Economy enables the participation of a significant portion of the 
world population for social production. 
 
b) Individual Freedoms  
 
Emerging networks have the potential of increasing individual autonomy 
in various ways. First of all, individuals are not subject to the large 
investments that were required to create or access the information. This 
allows individuals to do something for themselves or by themselves. For 
example, an individual can create a website that is literally available 
worldwide. Individuals can access to the ideas across the Internet within 
seconds. 
Individuals can create productions that will be only related to their 
immediate surrounding but still be accessible all over the world. For 
example, one can create his/her own family tree in Turkey and that tree can 
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* http://davinciautomata.wordpress.com/ 
be accessed from U.S.  As Benkler [states, individuals have the necessary 
tools to be effective in the information world [19]. 
Secondly, the extent of non-proprietary communication alternatives 
decreases the influence of traditional communication methods on users. 
For example, television’s passive listeners are turning into active users of 
emerging networks. The non-proprietary aspect of these communication 
alternatives allows the users to modify the communication method as they 
desire.  
Thirdly, networked information economy makes a diverse range of 
information available to the users. The availability of these ideas increases 
an individual’s ability to follow or reject these ideas. Such variety of ideas 
cannot be found in mass media where the purpose is to deliver a generic 
message that is somewhat relevant to the consumers.  
Davinci Automata* blog is an example of how the Networked Information 
Economy increases individuals’ autonomy. Davinci Automata is a blog on 
the Clockpunk genre of Science Fiction. It is designed for a segment of the 
population that is interested in this genre; thus it makes diverse information 
available to individuals. The owner has the open source tools to customize 
the blog as he wishes. The readers get turned into users by leaving 
comments or even submitting their work to be posted in this blog. 
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c) Political Freedoms 
 
In order to appreciate the value of political freedom, we first have to look 
into the existing relationship between media and politics. Mass media and 
modern democracies coevolved throughout the twentieth century [20]. One 
of the problems with the mass media is the fact that it sees the readers as 
consumers. The stream of information is usually one way and a generic 
message that would offend the least amount of people is published. The 
commercial concerns are always existent in the mass media.  
As the Networked Information Economy increases its impact, we see 
some changes in this pattern. Now the individuals are able to take a 
position in the Internet public sphere. Since the cost of being a speaker is 
very little to none, the messages can be shared without commercial or 
political concerns. This is actually part of the claim that the Internet 
democratizes. The end users have the ability to choose and ignore the 
messages that they want [20].  
The end users can now participate in the information processing, 
analysis of certain events that could have stayed obscure because of the 
expensive resources in the Industrial Information Economy like the Diebold 
Case.   
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Diebold Case:  
 
A great example of the political power of networked information 
economy is the Diebold case which focuses on the generative capacity of 
the newly emerging networks. Diebold is one of the leading manufacturers 
of the electronic voting machines in the world. Bev Harris, an activist who 
focuses on electronic voting machines, received a tip through her website 
blackboxvoting.com. She found a link to a publicly available website that 
included all of the files that described the working of the electronic voting 
machines [21].  
She pointed out that being able to access this site could have 
compromised the integrity of the election results in Georgia in 2002. 
Surprisingly, mass media did not show interest to this news. However, the 
editors of Scoop, an online journal in New Zealand, published the links for 
these files on their website and encouraged the readers to copy the content 
on their own computers in case it becomes inaccessible in the future. In 
addition, they provided tools to unzip (uncompress) the documents easily 
and repair the compressed files. It was reported that the data is not 
completely analyzed and their may be further security flaws in the system 
[21].  
The trend in this example was: 
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1) Distribute the data for all to see it (no cost for being a speaker). 
2) All were provided tools to [receive the data in its integrity (easier 
access to information).  
3) Forums were created for analysis and scooping (social collaboration).  
 
Meanwhile, someone provided thousands of internal e-mails that came 
from Diebold to Wired magazine. Wired magazine did not publish these e-
mails; however, Bev Harris received the same e-mails as well and she 
published them. Diebold threatened litigation and the e-mails were 
removed from her site. However, the e-mails were already copied by two 
students at Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania. These students 
distributed the data in the peer-to-peer networks like eDonkey and Bit 
Torrent. Although the students were threatened with infringement of 
copyrights, the court decided otherwise [21].  
The e-mails revealed that, through the analysis of some individuals 
without any direct financial motives, Diebold patched or updated the 
machines in California after their certification. Someone in the California 
Voting System Panel became aware of these e-mails and brought it to the 
attention of the Voting System Panel. Upon this information, Voting System 
Panel decertified many of the Diebold machines installed in California.  
The importance of this case is that a group of individuals who may never 
have met in person in their lifetime were able to access, distribute, analyze 
a certain amount of data, and present their findings to the rest of the 
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community. Commercial or even legal concerns did not stop individuals 
from presenting their findings. The empowered individuals’ action led to the 
decertification of certain voting machines.    
d) Cultural Freedoms 
 
Networked Information Economy contributes to cultural freedoms in two 
ways:  
1) The individuals can easily express their culture 
2) The impact of market based production is none to little in cultural 
production  
Firstly, individuals can express their own cultures. For example, one can 
create a website that focuses on Sufism in the Second Millennium in 
Anatolia while another can focus on folk songs in Kazakhstan. Contributors 
can create their own websites or blogs and relay the message directly to 
the readers without the involvement of a third party.  
Secondly, the individuals can express their own cultures without being 
influenced by market production because the cost of presenting such 
cultural information is almost none; the cultural expression is not bound by 
capital expenditures. Therefore messages are not shaped by commercial 
concerns and act outside of the market sphere.  
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On the other hand, Hollywood and the recording industry rightfully worry 
about the financial concerns. Ultimately, they try to create works that make 
the most profit for their companies and they [have to be extremely careful 
of the message that they give in their works. A message that is perceived in 
a wrong way by the masses can create a backlash for their companies and 
negatively impact financial considerations [22].  
Networked Information Economy gives power to the individuals to 
express their cultures easily without being bound by the prohibitive cost of 
developing material. Networked Information Economy allows the spread of 
diverse cultures that could not be distributed within the market framework 
because the small but unique audience of these cultural works may not 
yield financial gains.  
e) Justice and Development 
 
There are two fundamental benefits of the Networked Information Economy 
in justice and development around the world.  
- “Development: Countries or societies have access to the basic needs 
like food to survive and education to develop,  
- Justice, meaning that humans in a society will have somewhat equal 
opportunity to contribute and benefit to the developments.” [23] 
The spread of the products that arise from social production towards the 
world body allow poor countries to develop themselves. The chart below 
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shows the importance of having the ability to access information and its 
impact on the human development index (HDI).  
 
 
HDI and Information [23] 
 
HDI consists of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and GDP per 
capita. Life expectancy is affected by adequate nutrition and access to the 
life saving pharmaceuticals. Biotechnological innovation for agriculture as 
well as the spread of best practices of medicine uses Networked 
Information Technology characteristics including mass collaboration, non-
proprietary products, and non-market production. The outcome of these 
practices and innovations allow people to live healthier and longer.    
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Education is heavily dependent on access to materials such as 
textbooks, libraries and computers. GDP is driven by innovation and being 
able to live a healthy life and access to educational material is the basis of 
innovation.  
Following are some examples that contribute to the development arount 
the world.  
Software: The development of open source software, the publicly available 
specs of the Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) for the Internet and 
the services that do not depend on proprietary methods are already taking 
place as part of the Networked Information Economy [23].  
The development of open source software allows the developing 
countries to benefit from low cost alternatives that perform well. This allows 
the masses to benefit from developments that are occurring worldwide.  
 
Scientific Publication: One of the emerging scientific publications 
methods is similar to the open source architecture. Arxiv.org contains a 
copy of the working papers in physics, mathematics, and computer science 
which are available to the general public. Another example of scientific 
publication is the Free High School Science Texts (FHSST) project that has 
been developed for South Africa. MIT’s Open Courseware initiative makes 
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public thousands of notes. Syllabi from courses at MIT is successful proof 
of the impact of Networked Information Economy on scientific publication 
[23].  
Agriculture: There are promising developments like PIPRA (Public 
Intellectual Property for Agriculture) that combines the efforts of public 
universities and “agricultural research institutes aimed at managing their 
rights portfolio in a way that will give their own and other researchers 
freedom to operate in an institutional ecology increasingly populated by 
patents and other rights that make work difficult” [23].  
BIOS, an initiative by a non-profit in Australia, is focused on making 
publicly available tools and technologies used in agriculture. BIOS has a 
license similar to the General Public License of Linux, where anyone who 
builds upon the contributions of others must contribute improvements back 
to the other participants [23]. Like open source, the participants do not have 
to come from academic institutions or traditional government organizations 
and the general public can benefit from these licenses.  
f) Economics 
 
IBM’s business model is an excellent example of a strategy based on 
non-exclusivity. The firm has obtained the largest number of patents every 
year from 1993 to 2004, amassing in total more than 29,000 patents. IBM 
has been one of the firms most aggressively engaged in adapting its 
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business model to the emergence of open software. Figure 2.1 shows what 
happened to the relative weight of patent royalties, licenses, and sales in 
IBM’s revenues and revenues that the firm described as coming from Linux 
services.  
 
Selected IBM Revenues [24] 
 
Within a span of four years, the Linux-related services category moved 
from practically no revenues, to providing double the revenues from all 
patent-related sources. IBM has described itself as investing more than a 
billion dollars in free software developers, has hired programmers to help 
develop the Linux kernel and other free software; and has donated patents 
to the Free Software Foundation. This helped IBM to provide better 
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operating systems for its server business— making the servers better, 
faster, more reliable, and therefore more valuable to consumers. 
Participating in the free software development has also allowed IBM to 
develop service relationships with its customers, building on free software 
to offer customer-specific solutions. In other words, IBM has combined both 
supply-side and demand-side strategies to adopt a non-proprietary 
business model that has generated more than $2 billion annually for the 
firm [24].  
Networked Information Economy is a reality and keeps evolving. The 
growth of this economy is at times outside the scope of Industrial 
Information Economy but sometimes complements or replaces the 
Industrial Economy. Networked Information Economy will not completely 
replace the Industrial Information Economy but as said it will compete in 
certain areas. The only question is how much this growth will be assuming 
that the current environment does not change. 
Network Neutrality regulation is critical for the development of 
Networked Information Economy. End users enjoyed an environment 
where they did not have to ask permission from the networks owners to 
contribute to whatever they wanted to. End users’ applications were not 
discriminated against because they are not commercially viable. Network 
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Neutrality Regulation is seen as a protection that would preserve the 
current environment where end users enjoy great autonomy which allows 











5) Works on Network Neutrality  
 
Network Neutrality debates take place in the academia. This chapter 
focuses on the works of scholars who defended or opposed Network 
Neutrality Regulations.  
1) Christopher Yoo 
a) Beyond Network Neutrality Essay 
 
No Clear Competitive Harm  
 
Yoo* focuses on the no clear competitive harm principle to show that 
Network Neutrality regulations are not justified. Yoo states that: 
Fortunately, competition policy offers a potential way out of this analytical 
limbo. It suggests that when policymakers cannot determine whether a new 
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institutional form would help or hinder competition, the proper response is 
non-regulation until a practice is shown to affect a concrete harm to 
competition. Forbearance from either forbidding or mandating any 
particular solution leaves room for the experimentation upon which markets 
depend… [10].  
 
Not So Neutral Network 
 
Yoo further states that networks are not neutral since most of the 
Internet is based on the TCP/IP protocol, time-sensitive packets like voice 
or video are performing poorly compared to the non time sensitive data like 
e-mail or text messages. He also states that installing Network Neutrality 
will forestall the realization of economic benefits from the marketplace 
because it will prevent the generation of those benefits [10].   
 
 
Consequence of Regulation 
Yoo states that Network Neutrality can lead to market failures: “For 
example, Network Neutrality can exacerbate the impact of up-front, fixed 
costs and network economic effects, which are the most commonly 
identified sources of market failure that justify the regulation of 
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telecommunications markets” [10].  Yoo states that the competition in the 
last mile is basically a duopoly and increasing the competition in the last 
mile can be a remedy for Network Neutrality. However, regulation attempts 
may actually create a market failure in the last mile competition which might 
be the remedy for neutrality.  




Yoo discusses the Club Goods concept that he has inspired from Nobel 
laureate James Buchanan. Club goods are goods that can be shared by 
more than one person; however they are not public goods. The increased 
usage of these goods by some members of the “club” deteriorates the 
experience of other members.  
One of the primary issues that have emerged in the literature is whether 
a club should charge a single flat-rate price for membership or whether it 
should charge a price that varies with usage. Yoo states that flat rate 
pricing results in excessive consumption of club resources, which 
eventually leads to deteriorated service for the members [15]. 
  
Vertical Integration  
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Yoo states that vertical integration is a viable option that the network 
providers should be allowed to practice. A proposed Network Neutrality 
regulation may inhibit the usage of vertical integration. He further argues 
that the Supreme Court’s view on vertical integration has been initially 
negative but now the Court is more hospitable towards competition among 
vertically integrated enterprises [15].  
Yoo points to the other factors besides economic congestions for the 
Network Neutrality debates. He believes that allowing “network owners to 
differentiate the services they offer, exclusivity can play a key role in 
mitigating the sources of market failure that require regulatory intervention 




Yoo states that the supporters of the Network Neutrality use irrelevant 
examples from the past as their basis for argument. He indicates that using 
classic telecommunications precedents such as Hush-a-Phone Carterfone, 
and the Computer Inquiries ignore the fact that those decisions arose 
during an era when in which local telephone companies represented the 
only available means of transmission and in which the traffic consisted 
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solely of person-to-person communications. Network providers have less 




Yoo states that the FCC intervenes whenever it sees an anti-competitive 
practice that may inhibit the users from accessing the best services. He 
gives the example of Madison River ISP, where FCC intervened after the 
ISP blocked VoIP traffic. He is against a “blanket prohibition of any 




c) Yoo’s Network Diversity Proposal 
 
Professor Yoo explains in detail his alternate solution, Network Diversity. 
He believes if the producers specialize in one way, they will not be 
threatened by carriers which are trying to offer the same products. He gives 
the example of specialized stores that are surviving despite competition 
from low-cost mass market discounters. He further offers three different 
network types for markets. 
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1) Traditional Internet  Application Network for e-mail and website 
access 
2) Enhanced access with protection from viruses and spam 
3) Time sensitive Internet for voice and video  
He believes that if the network diversity were to be embraced, it would 
be better for the public policy because network diversity would provide 
product variety and be involved in the supply and demand side of the 
economics [10]. 
 
2) Timothy Wu 
a) Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination Essay 
 
Does Discrimination Occur? 
 
Wu* produces results of a study he conducted on the contractual 
restrictions that were defined by different cable and phone companies in 
2002. As seen below, cable companies imposed more restrictions than the 
phone companies. More importantly, some cable companies restricted the 
usage of VPNs, attaching of WiFi equipment or even home networking.
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Restriction of Broadband Providers on End Users [25] 
 
Few people who would argue that the spam, unlawful, offensive or 
immoral actions should not be restricted. Nevertheless, there would be 
many people who would be against the restrictions on VPNs or Wifi 
equipments.  
 
Is the Threat of Regulation Good?  
Wu argues that threat of regulation may be good for the industry. He states 
that the regulatory threat in 2003 pushed “Comcast and Cox 
Communications to openly disavow their old practices of placing bans on 
Virtual Private Networks, and fill documents with the FCC to that respect. 
Cable industry furthermore begun to publicly insist that it wants to avoid 
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broadband discrimination in the future, stating, for example, that “Cable 
Believes in Open Connectivity for the Internet.” [25].  
 
Why might thinking in discrimination terms be useful?  
 
Wu argues that discrimination is a familiar method that is used to achieve 
new goals. He gives an example in the employment context where the 
employers have the freedom to “fire or refuse to hire where the individuals 
for a range of reasons, such as education-level, intelligence, and 
demeanor.”  However, the employer cannot use race, sex, religion or 




This kind of discrimination bans activities that may hurt the network. For 
example the usages of spam or viruses are harmful for the network and 
should be banned. Wu understands that this is a departure from Network 
Neutrality but the network needs to be protected against harmful 
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The bad discrimination would be an unjustified one and would cause harm 
to the users. He gives the hypothetical example of banning chat programs 
because they may be perceived as a waste of time. He continues that such 
discrimination would first harm the chat users. However, there would be 
some negative externalities that are produced with this ban such as:  
1) The impact on applications programs like Aimster, which use chat 
programs as middle ware.  
 
2) Some people may not want to have broadband without chat programs.  
 
3) Positive Social Externalities such as scheduling a meeting, not bothering 
people on the public places by talking on the phone would be affected.  
 
Wu concludes: “there are considerable potential costs from an irrational or 
unjustified ban on certain application types.” [25] 
Why Do Operators Discriminate? 
 
Wu argues that there are two reasons for the regulators to discriminate. 
 
1) Price Discrimination: This is to exclusively offer some services that other 
market powers offer.  
 
2) Bandwidth Management: This is to reduce the amount of bandwidth that 
has been used by certain users.   
Wu argues that it might be good idea for operators to offer various levels of 
bandwidth, thus making a less-restrictive discrimination. 
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Open Access as a Means for Network Neutrality? 
 
Wu questions whether Network Neutrality can be accessed through Open 
Access models. Open Access in the context of networks would mean that 
network providers would open up their networks to the incumbents. Wu 
argues that the “proponents of open access have generally overlooked the 
fact that, to the extent an open access rule inhibits vertical relationships, it 
can help maintain the Internet’s greatest deviation from Network Neutrality.”  
Such favoritism means the support of data applications over delay sensitive 
applications like voice or video. Imposing open access models can prevent 
the network owner from offering low latency applications which need the 
support of the network. He concludes that, “There is also reason to believe 
that open access alone can be an insufficient remedy for many of the likely 




Network Neutrality Regime  
Wu argues that that “the basic principle behind a network anti-
discrimination regime is to give users the right to use non-harmful network 
attachments or applications, and give innovators the corresponding 
freedom to supply them. Such a regime avoids some of the costs of 
structural regulation by allowing for efficient vertical integration so long as 
the rights granted to the users of the network are not compromised.” [25]. 
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b) The Broadband Debate, A User’s Guide Essay 
 
In this essay, Wu categorizes the opponent and proponent of Network 
Neutrality regulation as Openists and Deregulationists and further breaks 
down their arguments [12].  
Openists  
1) Infrastructure  
Openists believe that the Internet is a public infrastructure. Thus the 
principal value of the network is indirect: it as a source of positive 
spillovers, or externalities that enable the work of others.  Openists 
suggest that the value of the network would be achieved by those who 
use it rather than those who deploy or own it [12].  
2) Neutrality Principle 
Openists believe that communications infrastructure must not 
discriminate between uses, users or content. Wu quotes the FCC 
commissioner Michael Copps: ‘‘From its inception, the Internet was 
designed, as those present during the course of its creation will tell you, 
to prevent government or a corporation or anyone else from controlling 
it.  It designed to defeat discrimination against users, ideas and 
technologies” [12].  
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3) End-to-end design 
End-to-end design rejects centralized, planned innovation where the 
network drives the progress. End-to-end design brings nearly unlimited 
end points which contribute to the innovation. Wu says: “The e2e 
principle assumes that innovation is an evolutionary process, driven by 
contests between competing approaches to a problem.  For Openists, 
the e2e principle puts as many players in the contest as possible to 
ensure the true champion emerges” [12]. 
 
Openists’ example 
 “Openists point to the electrical grid and say it is successful precisely 
because we don’t care about electricity as a product, but care instead 
about what the electric grid makes possible.  It provides a standardized 
platform for the development of appliances that serve human needs, such 
as the hair dryer or DVD player.  Sony and IBM do business safe in the 
assumption that American electricity will be predictable, standard provided 
without preference for certain brands or products.”  
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The electric grid does not favor one electric appliance over another and no 
permission is needed on what to plug on to the network besides regulatory 
compliance such as UL [12].   
 
Deregulationists 
Wu breaks down the Deregulationists’ position into three Principles.  
1) Propertization Principle 
This principle states that, “any given resource will generally reach its 
best use when mapped out as property, and assigned owners.”  The 
commons is a contentious issue because the owner of the commons is 
the public in general. Wu quotes Frank Easterbrook in “Cyberspace and 
the Law of the Horse: “‘we need to bring the Internet into the world of 
property law . . . without which welfare-increasing bargains cannot 
occur.’” [12]. 
2) Incentive Principle 
This principle states that, “communication networks are expensive 
investments and that companies will only build when given the prospect 
of a reasonable return on investment.” Since the government does not 
fund the majority of the infrastructure investments, the private sector 
needs incentives to build networks. Although some aspects of the 
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Internet (like Internet addresses) may be a public good or controlled by a 
natural monopoly, in general the private sector needs incentives.  
3) Deregulation Principle  
Wu states that the deregulationists are always, “suspicious of 
government regulations outside of the assignment of property rights.” 
Deregulationists believe more in the power of the network than the ideas 
that ride over it. Deregulationists believe that in the long term the private 
network owners will drive the next-generation of the Internet although in 
the short term it is the opposite.  
Common Vision between Openists and Deregulationists  
Wu states that both sides idolize innovation and with a few exceptions 
(Frischmann) worship at the shrine of economist Joseph Schumpeter and 
admire his concept of innovation as ‘‘creative destruction.’’ So both sides 
believe that innovation is the principle driver of the economic growth. As 
seen above, both sides disagree where most innovation occurs. While 
Openists believe that innovation occurs at the end users, the 
Deregulationists believe that innovation occurs at the network. Actually, this 
is similar to the historical development of telephone and data networks 
where one was focused on the network while the other one is focused on 
the end users.  
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Critical of both sides  
Wu criticizes both sides of the debates. First of all, he criticizes “Openists 
for being too prone to favor regulation without making clear the connection 
between ends and means”. He gives the example of attempts to make 
open access mandatory by Openists.  
He criticizes the Deregulationists for two reasons: “First, the 
Deregulationists have overlooked the fact that limiting government, as they 
desire, sometimes requires government action”.  Secondly, he criticizes 
“Deregulationists for an exaggerated faith in industry decision-making”. 
[12]. 
As seen in Wu’s broadband discrimination essay, the open access is not 
a remedy for the Network Neutrality debates and industry may discriminate 
unjustly [25].  
 
Vertical Integration 
Wu brings the vertical integration concept to the table because of the 
open access debates. As he previously criticized the open access as a 
remedy to the Network Neutrality debates, he quotes the proponents of 
vertical integration who say that vertical integration “leads to important 
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efficiencies” and “broadband operators, even if vertically integrated, want to 
make their product as valuable as possible and can therefore be expected 
to provide their customers with wide access to content and services” [12].  
Wu eases the concerns for vertical integration stating that even “a 
monopoly platform owner may find it a bad idea to make everything 
vertically integrated”. Nevertheless, there may be problems with Vertical 
integrations such as ‘‘incompetent incumbents’’ which do not realize the 
benefits of increased competition in the marketplace or other holes in the 
vertical integration [26].  
 
Deregulationists’ Objections to Network Neutrality Laws 
(Do no  harm) Primum Non Nocere 
Wu states that Primum Non Nocere objection has problems which means if 
there is no clear harm, there should not be any regulation.  He discusses “it 
simply raises a question of dueling baselines.  The existing design of the 
Internet is neutral.  Why should it not be private entities who follow the 
principle of ‘‘do no harm’’ before monkeying with the proven strengths of 
the existing design?  In this sense the slogan does nothing but restate an 
underlying difference in visions. “ [12] 
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He continues: “Second, the objection relies on an anti-regulatory straw-
man. Because it is possible to imagine a bad Network Neutrality law, any 
Network Neutrality regulation is suspect.” Network Providers do not want a 
Network Neutrality rule that would prevent them from entering the market. 
Wu states that there is no indication that the network providers would be 
excluded from the content market [12].  
 
Yoo’s Critisism  
Wu criticizes Yoo in three different aspects: 
1) Wu does not see any clear reason why a neutral Internet would cause 
problems in the last mile. He adds: “Yoo seems to have it backward: if the 
neutral network is no good for certain applications, that would drive 
facilities-based competition, not inhibit it. Much of the cell-phone networks, 
for example, were built in the 1990s, and the Internet proved no barrier.” 
2) Wu states that the proposed network diversity is already in our lives 
through mobile networks which prioritize voice and also offer data.  
3) Wu criticizes “Yoo’s premise that vigorous competition at every layer is 
always better for the consumer is overstated.  He downplays, to the point of 
elimination, the basic economic benefits of standardization... Most people 
in the United States speak a standard language, English.  This undoubtedly 
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leads to some sacrifice. We lose, for example, the precision of German; we 
lack the Chinese vocabulary for food; and we lose righteousness and 
occasional elegance of the French language.  But few would argue that 
vigorous and ongoing competition for a standard American language would 
clearly serve consumer welfare.  It would be, instead, the Tower of Babel.” 
[12].  
Wu concludes with the following two questions: How valuable neutral 
standards and networks are? When they are worth a loss in competition in 
the network.  
c) Wu’s Network Neutrality Proposal 
Wu proposes a Network Neutrality draft in his essay titled “The Broadband 
Debate, A User’s Guide” [12]. 
§ 1. General Right to Unrestricted Network Usage. Broadband Users have 
the right reasonably to use their Internet connection in ways which are not 
illegal or harmful to the network. Accordingly neither Broadband Operators 
nor the Federal Communications commission shall impose restrictions on 
the use of an Internet connection except as necessary to: 
(1) Comply with any legal duty created by federal, state or local statute, or 
as necessary to comply with any executive order, warrant, legal injunction, 
subpoena, or other duly authorized governmental directive;  
(2) Prevent physical harm to the local Broadband Network caused by any 
network attachment or network usage; 
(3) Prevent Broadband users from interfering with other Broadband or 
Internet Users’ use of their Internet connections, including but not limited to 
neutral limits on bandwidth usage, limits on mass transmission of 
unsolicited email, and limits on the distribution of computer viruses, worms, 
and limits on denial-of service-or other attacks on others; 
  52 
* Atkinson is President of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation 
** Weiser is an Associate Professor at the University of Colorado, where he has a joint 
appointment with the School of Law and the Interdisciplinary Telecommunications Program 
(4) Prevent violations of the security of the Broadband network, including all 
efforts to gain unauthorized access to computers on the Broadband 
network or Internet; 
(5) Serve any other purpose specifically authorized by the Federal 
Communications Commission, based on a weighing of the specific costs 
and benefit of the restriction. 
 
It is worth noting that the following exception which was previously 
presented in a submission to the FCC has been taken out of this draft. 
“Ensure the quality of the Broadband service, by eliminating delay, jitter or 
other technical aberrations.” [28] 
 
Actually, the draft which included the above exception has been presented 
to FCC along with Lawrence Lessig’s draft in August 2003 [28].   
3) Robert Atkinson and Phil Weiser   
a) A “Third Way” For Network Neutrality  
 
Atkinson* and Weiser** (A&W) analyze the reasons for heated Network 
Neutrality debates and relate it to the lack of competition in the last mile. 
They analyze the arguments of both supporters and opponents and 
propose their own solution which includes government incentive as a 




A&W focus on two bills in the congress that failed to pass regarding 
Network Neutrality. On the one extreme, the Barton Bill (H.R. 5252, “The 
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Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act”) tried to 
limit the power of the FCC to regulate broadband providers. On the other 
extreme, the Markey Bill (H.R. 5273, “The Network Neutrality Act of 2006”) 
would limit the broadband owners to provide and charge for higher quality 
of service. However, neither of the bills passed the congress [27].  
 
Why debate is so heated in the U.S. ? 
 
A&W believe the lack of competition on the last mile is one of the reasons 
for the heated debate in the U.S. They state that, “unlike many other 
nations, such as France and Japan, which employed a “line-sharing” model 
(that facilitates multiple DSL competitors using the incumbent’s copper 
local loop), the United States pursued a different strategy. The issue of net 
neutrality is largely moot in these nations because consumers in these 
countries enjoy both a greater level of competition and more bandwidth 
than in the United States.” [27]  
Therefore, A&W believe that the Network Neutrality rules reflect a short-
term solution in the absence of a longer-term imperative: more robust 
competition in broadband markets and the build-out of higher speed, best-
effort data pipes. 
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Three Sides of the Debate 
Transparency 
“This issue relates to how clearly broadband providers state the policies 
that govern the uses of their networks”. Although this subject did not get 
much attention yet, the broadband providers may need to clearly state their 
offerings and may need to meet some bandwidth requirements to use the 
term “broadband” for their networks.  
Blocking 
Network providers have the ability to block the content based on of its type 
and origin. As of today, as seen in the intervention of the FCC in the 
Madison ISP case, blocking – unless justified by a legitimate business 
purpose (such as protecting the network) — should be illegal.  
 
Tiering 
The two proposed regulations, the Barton and Markey Bills, were on the 
extreme side of the tiering. Barton Bill proposed unfettered rights to 
broadband providers to prioritize traffic and Markey Bill proposed a 
complete ban on all kinds of prioritizations.  
Network Neutrality Supporters’ Camp  
 
  55 
 
A&W divide the discussion into two camps. Actually, they call them “The 
End of the Internet As We Know It?” Part I and Part II because both sides 
claim that regulation or no regulation will change the Internet as we know it. 
First of all, they cite Lawrence Lessig and Senator Ron Wyden who support 
Network Neutrality regulations. Lessig mentions the importance of the end-
to-end design which is critical for “the freedom and innovation that has 
characterized Internet to date”. Wyden supports a Network Neutrality 
agreement that would ban any kind of tiers of Internet service. Wyden is 
aware that such proposals would inhibit certain services that require QoS 
but he states that such a trade–off is warranted because “[c]reating a two-
tiered system could have a chilling effect on small mom and pop 
businesses that can’t afford the priority lane, leaving these smaller 
businesses no hope of competing against the Wal-Marts of the world.” 
Lessig and Wyden’s concerns can be summarized as “innovation 
without permission” which also represents “the essence of the Internet.”   
A&W state that Wyden’s approach overlooks certain concerns such 
as the incentive of network providers to deploy new networks. Network 
owners should be able to involve in vertical integration. A&W give the 
movie theater example: “For movie theatre owners, for example, an 
effective and consumer-friendly price discrimination strategy is charging a 
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high price for popcorn. By charging a high price, movie theaters are able to 
identify and serve consumers with sufficient discretionary income to buy 
popcorn. For other consumers, the high priced sale of popcorn subsidizes 
their ability to go to the movies” [27]. 
Network Neutrality Opponents’ Camp  
 
On this side, there are people such as Randy May who believe that 
Network Neutrality regulations similar to the one proposed in the Markey 
Bill can inhibit new investments by network operators. May argues that 
there is no need for Network Neutrality regulations because customers can 
change their broadband provider if one of the providers starts 
discriminating certain traffic [27]. 
A&W argue that there is not enough competition in the last mile that 
would allow the customers to change broadband providers easily. “In terms 
of the state of competition, deregulatory opponents of any Network 
Neutrality regulation often maintain that competition between broadband 
providers is a sufficient check on the possibility of anticompetitive conduct. 
Unfortunately, the current reality of the broadband market is that in most 
local markets there are only two principal competitors—the incumbent 
telephone companies (with their DSL offering) and the incumbent cable 
companies (with their cable modem offering)” [27]. 
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b) Atkinson and Weiser’s Proposed Model 
 
A&W propose a model that would address the problems of Network 
Neutrality in the long run. As discussed before, their key elements are 
transparency, blocking, and tiering. 
Their proposed model consists of three parts: 
 
1) Consumer Protection: The broadband usage policies need to be clear. 
Once they are well understood by the customers, the FCC needs to 
monitor the broadband providers to make sure that they are complying. 
Broadband providers must offer some unmanaged broadband that 
should be delivered on the best effort basis.  
Broadband speed needs to be increased and those who do not meet 
that speed should not call themselves a broadband provider.  
 
2) Competition Policy: The FCC should rely on Powell’s four points. 
Broadband providers can offer QoS arrangements and interestingly can 
even block some content if necessary. The Clearwire example suggests 
that it is better to have competition in the last mile rather than having 
blocked VoIP content. The FCC should look at anti-competitive cases 
one by one; however, it is not certain whether the FCC has the power to 
perform such a task.  
 
3) Depreciation and Tax Incentives: The broadband should be extended 
by depreciation and tax incentives. This can be done through 
depreciation of deployed networks and extension of the current 
moratorium on broadband related taxes. 
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4) Brett Frischmann   
An Economic Theory of Commons and Infrastructure Management  
 
Reframing Network Neutrality Debate 
 
Frischmann* believes that the focus of the Network Neutrality debate needs 
to change. “The Network Neutrality debate is not really about neutrality per 
se; nor is it about innovation alone. The debate must broaden its focus from 
the merits of sustaining an innovation commons to the merits of sustaining 
an infrastructure commons —that is, of sustaining open, public access to 
infrastructure. The debate ought to be about optimizing the Internet for 
society as a whole and it ought to take into account the full range of 




Frischmann refers to the infrastructure as a physical resource made by 
humans for public consumption. Examples can include (1) transportation 
systems, such as highway systems, railways, airline systems, and ports; (2) 
communication systems, such as telephone networks and postal services; 
(3) governance systems, such as court systems; and (4) basic public 
services and facilities, such as schools, sewers, and water systems [29]. 
Frischmann then refers them as Traditional Infrastructures and states 
two generalizations about them. First of all, government plays a significant 
role in these infrastructures and secondly they are generally managed in an 
openly accessible manner. Open does not mean free as people pay for 
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phone calls or pay for tolls on the highways. Open also does not mean 
unregulated as hazardous items are regulated for shipping or mailing. All of 
these infrastructures provide positive externalities ranging from helping 
people to go from home to work, connecting people via phone or e-mail or 
shipping life saving medications.  
End-to-end Design and QoS  
Frischmann is aware that end-to-end design may not be the best choice for 
the real time communications, but he states that QoS implementation 
would create a different kind of bias. “Just as the current end-to-end design 
favors data applications at the expense of time-sensitive applications, 
shifting to a fine-grained QoS regime also may exhibit a bias for particular 
applications, specifically for commercial applications that generate 
observable and appropriable returns.” [29]. 
He believes that such bias would remove the insulation enjoyed by the 
end users because the network would discriminate against certain end user 
created applications.  
Frischmann notices the pressure to make the Internet more centralized 
rather than more distributed as it is today. He believes that such pressure 
should be resisted and the Internet should be sustained as an infrastructure 
commons. There will be some costs related to it like poor or no QoS for real 
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time communications but this is necessary for the benefits of the 
infrastructure commons. The benefits are the positive externalities that are 
created on this infrastructure commons. One of them is innovation as 
discussed many times in this essay. However, Frischmann’ focus on 
innovation is not limited to the observable market response because 
Frischmann states that: “market competition judges the merit of outputs on 
the basis of observable and appropriable returns rather than on overall 
social welfare.” [29] 
Internet  
Frischmann states that the “Internet is a mixed commercial, public, and 
social infrastructure” and he believes that “public and social aspects of the 
Internet infrastructure are largely undervalued in the current debate”. He 
expresses that “bringing these aspects of the Internet into focus 
strengthens the case for preserving the end-to-end architecture of the 
Internet.” [29]. 
Although it is very hard to measure the social value of the Internet, it is 
apparent that Internet changing the lives of people like other infrastructures 
but also in a very “rapid, widespread and dramatic fashion” [29]. This is 
similar to the comments made by Yochai Benkler about the Networked 
Information Economy [16].  
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The Debate for Net Neutrality is Myopic  
Frischmann argues that the current debate is skewed because it focuses 
myopically on neutrality, competition theory, and innovation. Because much 
more is at stake than the current debate reflects, a new lens is needed. He 
summarizes his opinion with the following diagrams.  
 
 
Network Neutrality Balancing:  
An Oversimplified View of the Current Debate [29] 
 




Network Neutrality Balancing:  










5) Barbara van Schewick 
Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation 
Essay 
Barbara van Schewick* first analyzes whether the discrimination threat is 
real. She states that, ” Although a network provider does not generally have 
an incentive to discriminate against independent providers of content, 
applications or content, the analysis has highlighted a variety of 
  63 
* Senior Researcher, Telecommunication Networks Group, Department of Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science, Technical University Berlin, Germany, and Non-Residential 
Fellow, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School  
circumstances under which it may have such an incentive. Such an 
incentive may not only occur if it has a (local) monopoly in the market for 
Internet services, but also if it faces competition. Whether the conditions 
giving rise to such an incentive are present in a real life situation, is an 
empirical question.” [30]
Once she concludes that the threat is real, she looks at the impact of 
this threat on different levels. She first examines the impact on the 
application-level innovation and she determines that there will be 
detrimental impact on this kind of innovation. She believes that even 
though there might be innovation coming from the carriers on the 
application level, the innovation that would be generated by the 
independent users that are blocked by discrimination is far greater than the 
carriers can create [30]. 
The second impact she analyzes is the social welfare. She states that 
there should be a regulation for Network Neutrality if the social benefits are 
greater than the cost of the regulation. She states that the Internet has the 
potential of significantly increasing economic growth. Actions that reduce 
the amount of application-level innovation have the potential to significantly 
harm social welfare by significantly limiting economic growth. There would 
definitely be costs associated with regulation such as the impact on 
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network providers and the cost of regulation itself. As a result, she makes 
the following comparisons:  
 
a) Application-Level Innovation vs. Innovation at the Network Level:  
“Research on information-technology based general-purpose technologies 
suggests that increasing co-invention is more important than increasing 
innovation in the general-purpose technology itself. Applied to the Internet, 
this implies that increasing application-level innovation is relatively more 
important than increasing innovation at the network level” [30].  
b) Application-Level Innovation vs. Deployment of Network 
Infrastructure  
Even though the network providers’ profits would be negatively affected by 
a regulation, it would not prevent them from investing. They just would not 
have an advantage to discriminate against rivals. It there is not enough 
profit, it does not necessarily mean that they will stop deploying new 
networks as the competition can force them to do that.   
She concludes that calls for Network Neutrality regulations are justified 
[but she states that more research is needed to determine the coverage of 
such regulation [30].  
6) Lawrence Lessig 
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In my opinion, Lessig is the most influential person among the scholars 
who are mentioned above. His work is beyond Network Neutrality debates 
and it includes topics such as copyright, fair use, and free culture.  He is 
named one of Scientific America’s Top 50 Visionaries [31]. 
Lessig cosigned with Wu a submission to the FCC about Network 
Neutrality [28]. In 2006, he testified in the congress about Network 
Neutrality and proposed his own recommendation [13]. In his 
recommendation, he said that Powell’s four freedoms need to be kept and 
a fifth one should be added. The fifth one should be about the prohibition of 
access-tiering. This would mean a company cannot receive special 
treatment on the network. Lessig also adds: “To oppose access-tiering, 
however, is not to oppose all tiering. He proposes that the broadband 
providers can do customer-tiering where they are eligible to provide 
different classes of services for voice, video or regular Internet. However, 
none of these should be geared towards a company. Thus, anti-
competitiveness of access-tiering would be eliminated and customer-tiering 
will create enough incentives for companies to deploy networks”  [13].  
Although Lessig may have less work in the specific area of Network 
Neutrality than other scholars, he is the inspiration to many works in this 
area including the author of these lines.  
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The debate about Network Neutrality is a complex one because data 
networks, mainly the Internet, have tremendous impact on billions of 
people’s lives. In this essay, I attempted to summarize some of the 
discussions about Network Neutrality. Scholars cited in this essay looked at 
the issue from different perspectives ranging from economical gains to 
threats to innovation environment to infrastructure concepts.  
The following points need to be considered before entering in this 
debate as it summarizes most of the concerns which are cited in this essay.  
1) The extent of any Network Neutrality regulation needs to be explained 
further. Being against or for Network Neutrality regulation is meaningless 
without knowing the details of such regulation.  
 
2) We cannot ignore the fact that there is a duopoly in the last mile and 
there is no clear sign that this will change in the near future. Although 
there are some attempts to have wireless networks or Broadband over 
Power lines as competitive alternatives, they still do not reach to the 
level of cable or DSL and it is not certain when they will reach that level. 
Thus consumers may not have too many choices to allow the market to 
regulate itself.  
 
3) The end-to-end design has been very important on the development of 
the Internet. Networked Information Economy is based on end-to-end 
design and it has economical benefits. Its social impact on freedoms and 
justice around the world cannot be ignored.  
 
4) The End-to-end design is very powerful and should be kept. However, it 
does not always perform well for certain applications. Therefore, network 
providers should be able to benefit from vertical integration while 
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watching out for holes in the vertical integration. The applications should 
be favored rather than the companies that deploy them.  
 
5) Networks are public infrastructures that bring many positive externalities. 
This does not mean that companies that deploy networks should be 
exempt from making money, but the social benefits of the networks as 
shown in the Networked Information Economy are crucial. Thus the 
debate should not be limited to economical terms.  
 
It is difficult to predict what the future will bring for the Network Neutrality 
debates. The supporters and opponents of Network Neutrality regulations 
are far from reaching a consensus. I believe that as the amount of scholarly 
works which address the economical and social aspects of this debate 
increase, it will be easier to reach a consensus.  
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